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In the philosophy of mind, Frank Jackson's famous
Mary Argument is also known as the Knowledge
Argument. More appropriately, perhaps, one might
have called it the No Knowledge Argument, for Jackson's thought experiment
attempts to demonstrate the non-physicalness of phenomenal consciousness by
pointing out (with respect to the envisaged scenario) that at a certain time in her
career Mary has no knowledge of certain aspects of phenomenal consciousness,
whereas, at that same time, she has complete knowledge of the physical world.
In Nagasawa's book, this well-known knowledge argument of the philosophy of mind
is connected with less-known other knowledge arguments (as Nagasawa calls them),
namely, with certain atheological arguments in the field of the philosophy of
religion, arguments which attempt to demonstrate the non-existence of God by
pointing out that God's omniscience is incompatible with His other traditional
perfections (where, of course, it is presupposed that the possession of all traditional
divine perfections is necessary for the existence of God). Again, these other
knowledge arguments might have been more appropriately called no knowledge
arguments, for they typically try to show that God, given His other traditional divine
perfections, must have no knowledge of something or other, and must therefore lack
omniscience (hence existence).
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Making a connection between the prototypical (No) Knowledge Argument and the
atheological (no) knowledge arguments is not as far-fetched and artificial as one
might think at first sight. Remember that the assertion of Mary's lack of knowledge
regarding certain aspects of phenomenal consciousness is regarded (by proponents
of the argument) as being justified by pointing out that she has not had certain
experiences (given the black-and-white environment she lives in), the crucial
presupposition being that without those experiences she cannot in any other way
acquire that knowledge. Analogously, one might argue (and Nagasawa dedicates two
chapters of the eight chapters of his book -- Chapters 3 and 4 -- to examining the
argument in detail) that God does not fully comprehend the concept of fear (and
therefore is not omniscient) because -- given His omnipotence -- He has not
experienced fear, the crucial presupposition this time being that without the
experience of fear God cannot in any other way fully comprehend the concept of
fear.
How does Nagasawa position himself with regard to the Knowledge Argument and
with regard to the atheological argument I just described -- let me call it "the
Atheological Knowledge Argument" (Nagasawa calls it "the Argument from Concept
Possession")? On p. 124, he casts the arguments in the following two parallel forms
(my presentation is slightly simplified):
The Knowledge Argument:
M = P.
M is a proper subset of T.
Therefore: P is a proper subset of T -- contradicting physicalism, which
requires P = T.
The Atheological Knowledge Argument:
G = D.
G is a proper subset of T.
Therefore: D is a proper subset of T -- contradicting traditional theism,
which requires D = T.
Here, M is the set of propositions that Mary knows, G the set of propositions that
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God actually knows, P the set of true physical propositions, D the set of true
propositions that God can (in fact) know, and T the set of true propositions.
With regard to the Atheological Knowledge Argument in the above set-theoretical
form, Nagasawa states (ibid.) that its first premise is uncontroversially true. In
saying this, Nagasawa seems to overlook that the argument is supposed to be an
atheological argument (and, moreover, does not have the form of a reductio ad
absurdum); if its first premise were true, it would not fulfill this purpose (nor would
it do so, of course, if that premise were false). It is quite true that "G = D" simply
means that God knows everything true that He can know (p. 124-125; Nagasawa
omits the word "true," which I believe had better be inserted). But if the set D is non-
empty -- and how could it not be non-empty since it is supposed to be "the set of all
true propositions such that their being known is consistent with necessary divine
attributes" (p. 124)?  -- , then the set G is non-empty too (in the presence of the,
allegedly, uncontroversial truth "G = D"), and therefore God knows some
proposition -- which surely means that He exists, does it not?
Thus, the Atheological Knowledge Argument -- in the form Nagasawa gives it -- need
not be attacked by theists -- because it is self-stultifying. Its first premise entails the
existence of God, the very contradictory of what the argument is intended to
establish. One might respond that the "Atheological" Knowledge Argument, read
rightly, does not aim to establish the non-existence of God, but only that traditional
theism is false -- in the face of the acknowledged existence of God (as entailed by its
first premise). However, this is not what critics of traditional theism usually have in
mind, and it is certainly not what the critics of traditional theism Nagasawa has in
mind have in mind (see p. 44). As far as Nagasawa's reconstruction of the argument
is concerned, it must be denied that his assertion that "G = D" is uncontroversially
true is itself true.
With regard to the Knowledge Argument in the above set-theoretical form,
Nagasawa proposes to reject it by rejecting its first premise, while accepting "for the
sake of the argument" its second premise (p. 123). According to Nagasawa (ibid.),
"very few philosophers" have questioned the argument's first premise. Nagasawa
announces that in questioning the first premise he will also offer a "new objection" to
the argument. But the only thing to be said about the first premise of the Knowledge
Argument in the above form is that every philosopher knows that premise to be false.
There never was, is, or will be a human being who is physically omniscient, that is, a
[1]
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human being with regard to whom "M = P" (referring "M" to any human being) is
true. And therefore a physically omniscient Mary -- in a deterministic physical world,
she would be the equivalent of Laplace's Demon, and in a non-deterministic physical
world, she would even surpass that demon -- does not exist, nor has she ever existed,
nor will she ever exist.
There is no need to deny that Mary is physically omniscient: every philosopher
knows that she is not. What, then, is the true form of the Knowledge Argument since,
evidently, it is not the one presented above? The nature of the Knowledge Argument,
which Nagasawa appears to have missed entirely (in any case, he does not make it
explicit), is this: it is a counterfactual argument, referring essentially to what is true
in a certain counterfactual situation and to what is supposed to be necessitated by
that which is true in that situation. Thus, the gist of the Knowledge Argument is this:
If Mary [take any Mary you know] were physically omniscient [contra
factum!] but subject to conditions that allowed her to have experiences only in
a rather limited way, she would not be omniscient simpliciter.
But if physicalism is true, then Mary would be omniscient simpliciter if she
were physically omniscient, even though she were at the same time subject to
conditions that allowed her to have experiences only in a rather limited way.
Therefore: Physicalism is false.
Jackson's description of the situation Mary finds herself in -- the Mary-scenario -- is
intended to establish the truth of the first premise of this argument. The central
issue in this regard must be whether Mary's lack of certain experiences leads indeed
(inexorably) to her lack of knowledge with regard to certain aspects of phenomenal
consciousness (cf. above the italicized presupposition of the Knowledge Argument).
Physicalists will of course deny the necessity of the no-experience-no-knowledge
nexus; dualists will of course assert it. It is doubtful whether an impartial rational
judging of the matter is possible.
In contrast, the second premise of the Knowledge Argument in counterfactual form
is evidently true. Finally, the logical form of the Knowledge Argument in
counterfactual form amounts, fully spelled out, to this:
If A and B were the case, then C would not be the case.
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Φ ⊃ (if A and B were the case, then C would be the case).
It is possible that A and B.
Therefore: non-Φ.
Here "⊃" can be taken to stand simply for material implication. Thus, the Knowledge
Argument in counterfactual form is logically correct: the conclusion does follow
logically from its premises -- one of which, the third one, is indeed a tacitly
understood premise, but nevertheless a true premise if "possible" is understood in
the appropriate, weak sense: It is possible (i.e., true in some possible world) that
Mary is physically omniscient and at the same time subject to conditions that allow
her to have experiences only in a rather limited way. (Note that this last sentence is
the third -- the tacit -- premise of the Knowledge Argument in counterfactual form.)
Now, does Nagasawa address the question of the truth of the crucial first premise of
the above argument -- of the first premise of the Knowledge Argument in
counterfactual form, not of the straw-man argument he substitutes for it? Does he
question the truth of "If Mary were physically omniscient but subject to conditions
that allowed her to have experiences only in a rather limited way, she would not be
omniscient simpliciter"? He does not. Instead, his criticism of the Mary Argument --
which is the Knowledge Argument -- comes down to something which has nothing to
do with that premise: "Jackson's assumption (32) -- that is, in principle, one can be
physically omniscient by simply reading black-and-white books and watching black-
and-white television -- is false and the Mary argument fails" (p. 128). For Nagasawa,
the falsity of Jackson's assumption is supposed to refute or to cast doubt on the
thesis that Mary is physically omniscient -- the thesis which is the first premise in
Nagasawa's straw-man reconstruction of the Mary Argument (see above). That the
falsity of Jackson's assumption has such consequences is rather questionable in
itself. But, as I noted before, no philosopher believes that Mary is physically
omniscient anyway. Curiously, Nagasawa believes that "a number of philosophers
take it for granted that Mary is physically omniscient" (p. 131); he gives references
for Chalmers, Loar, Lycan, Pettit, Sommers, and Vierkant. What Nagasawa should
have said is this: these philosophers take it for granted that it is possible (i.e., true in
some possible world) that Mary is physically omniscient.
If one reads Nagasawa benevolently (which, note, I am not unwilling to do), then one
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can take him to be rejecting the third premise of the Knowledge Argument in
counterfactual form, which premise states a matter of possibility, not of actual fact.
For this, one must assume that Nagasawa, when referring to the question of Mary's
physical omniscience (in conjunction with her rather limited access to experiences),
means to refer to a question of possibility, and not to a question of actual fact (which
he, however, more often than not appears to mean to refer to, especially judging by
the way in which he formulates the Knowledge Argument). The rejection of the third
(the tacit) premise would block the Knowledge Argument in counterfactual form,
since that premise is indeed needed: without it, the two other premises might be
made true in a trivial manner, no matter what the truth-value of physicalism (Φ).
But has Nagasawa adequately shown that that third premise is false or doubtful? Has
he shown it to be false or doubtful that it is possible (i.e., true in some possible
world) that Mary is physically omniscient and at the same time subject to conditions
that allow her to have experiences only in a rather limited way? I don't believe he
has.
In the alleged failure of the Mary Argument, Nagasawa sees motivation for assuming
the following thesis (p. 132):
(i) Physical omniscience is omniscience simpliciter.
This he combines with the following thesis that he also believes to be made plausible
by considerations surrounding the Mary Argument (ibid.):
(ii) Theoretically communicable physical omniscience is not omniscience
simpliciter.
And he tells us (p. 136):
(iii) Omniscience simpliciter requires an instantiation of extraordinary
epistemic powers to intuit relevant propositions.
Well, who would have expected that? What news is it to be told that (iii) is true? The
conjunction of the epistemic theses (i), (ii), and (iii) added to the ontological claim of
physicalism that everything in this world is physical is called "nontheoretical
physicalism" by Nagasawa (p. 13). I have already noted that (iii) goes without saying;
(i), in turn, is a consequence of the ontological claim of physicalism, and in this sense
also goes without saying. This leaves us with (ii). But (ii) is no news either. Not every
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true physical proposition can be expressed in a language of theoretical
communication (i.e., by some finite statement); hence (ii) can only be true.
Thus, the ontological claim of physicalism -- not the superstructure of Nagasawa's
"nontheoretical physicalism" -- turns out to be what is mainly interesting. According
to Nagasawa, "the fact that the two of the strongest existing arguments against
physicalism fail [i.e., Jackson's Mary and Nagel's Bat] increases further the
plausibility of physicalism, which has already been very high" (p. 137). But Nagasawa
has not established that the failure of those arguments is a "fact"; moreover, I beg to
differ regarding the "very high plausibility" of physicalism. (For more on these
matters, see my 2004 book, The Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psycho-
Physical Dualism.)
Nagasawa is in sympathy with philosophical attempts to combine "theism in the
Abrahamic tradition" with "physicalism in general" (p. 143). This makes me wonder
which part of the physical world God -- the Abrahamic god (in the Judaic, Christian,
or Islamic tradition) -- might plausibly be now. If, however, He is considered to exist
now without being a part of the physical world and "physicalism in general" is
nevertheless supposed to be true by Abrahamic theistic physicalists, then is not this
position somewhat embarrassing for them?
I finally come to a minor point of criticism, which I nevertheless would like to voice
here, because it seems to me to be symptomatic for an ever-increasing logical
sloppiness in philosophical publications. The three reviewers for Cambridge
University Press who read the manuscript (p. xiii) and Nagasawa himself have
overlooked that he does not state the definitions of the various kinds of omniscience
properly. On p. 7, we read:
Omniscience Simpliciter: For any x, and for any proposition p, x is omniscient
if and only if:  if it is true that p, then x knows that p.
The correct formulation is this:
Omniscience Simpliciter: For any x, x is omniscient if and only if, for any proposition
p, if it is true that p, then x knows that p.
Perhaps Nagasawa thought that it does not matter where he puts the all-quantifier
that binds the variable "p". Well, it does matter. For in Nagasawa's formulation the
[2]
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definition of omniscience simpliciter has the following interesting instantiation:
Tommy is omniscient if and only if: if it is true that 1+1=2, then Tommy
knows that 1+1=2.
Nagasawa's egregious mistake is repeated in his definition of physical omniscience
(p. 7), in his definition of divine omniscience (p. 11), and in his definition of
theoretically communicable physical omniscience (p. 12-13). According to Nagasawa
(if we take him by his word), Tommy is divinely omniscient if and only if: if it is true
that 1+1=2, then Tommy knows that 1+1=2. I hasten to add that, as far as I can see,
these errors of formulation lead to no errors of thought in Nagasawa's interesting
book.
 Surely the proposition that 1+1=2 is in D.
 I have inserted a colon -- which is not in the original -- to make the sentence
easier to read.
[1]
[2]
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